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THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
Spring Term 1990
CITY OF NORTHWOOD,
Appellant
v. Docket No. 89-27
SECRETARY, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
and MULTI-CHEM CHEMICAL CO.,
Appellees
JUDGES' MEMORANDUM
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves two causes of action under the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988), by the
City of Northwood ("the City") to address chemical contami-
nation of the Northwood National Wildlife Refuge ("the Ref-
uge") from Multi-Chem Chemical Company ("Multi-Chem"),
a pesticide processing plant. The City of Northwood com-
menced this action in the United States District Court for the
District of New Union in the spring of 1989. The suit consists
of two causes of action under CERCLA. The first seeks to
compel an assessment of the natural resource damages in-
curred at the Northwood National Wildlife Refuge, while the
second seeks compensation for these damages.
The first cause of action is a citizen suit by the City of
Northwood to compel the Department of Interior ("the De-
partment"), as trustee of the Refuge, to carry out its nondis-
cretionary duties under section 107(f) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(f). Specifically, the City desires to force the Depart-
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ment to conduct a natural resource damage assessment and to
recover from Multi-Chem amounts necessary to restore the
Refuge. (R. 4).
Alternatively, in the second cause of action, the City of
Northwood asserts rights as trustee of the Refuge and pro-
ceeds against Multi-Chem under section 107(a) of CERCLA,
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), for damages for injury to the Refuge, in-
cluding the cost of assessing the injury. (R. 5).
The district court granted the motions of the Department
and Multi-Chem to dismiss. (R. 3). With respect to the De-
partment's motion to dismiss the citizen suit action, the dis-
trict court ruled that the Department's decision not to per-
form a natural resource damage assessment at the Refuge was
a discretionary enforcement decision that was not properly
the subject of a citizen suit action. The court also dismissed
the action brought by the City against Multi-Chem, ruling
that a city may not act as a natural resource trustee under
section 107(f)(2)(B) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C § 9607(f)(2)(B),
unless authorized by the state. (R. 5, 6).
The City petitioned the United States Court of Appeals
for the Twelfth Circuit to review both claims and the peti-
tions were granted. (R. 1). Multi-Chem joins the Department
in arguing that the City may not compel the Department to
conduct a natural resource damage assessment. The Depart-
ment joins the City in arguing that the City should be allowed
to act as trustee of the Refuge.
SUMMARY OF THE FACTS
The City of Northwood is a municipality in the State of
New Union. Within the municipal boundaries is the
Northwood National Wildlife Refuge. The Refuge is consid-
ered by the City to be the focal point of Northwood, as it is an
important aesthetic and recreational resource which has been
credited with Northwood's development as an affluent bed-
room community for professionals who commute to nearby
New Union City. (R. 1, 2).
The Refuge is located along an important flyway for sev-
eral species of geese and other waterfowl, and serves as an es-
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sential haven for these migratory birds. (R. 1, 2). The Refuge
is owned and administered by the Department of the Interior,
but is subject to municipal ordinances and is served by the
City's utilities, including fire protection and trash removal.
(R. 2).
Multi-Chem Chemical Company operated a pesticide
processing plant on the edge of the Refuge, outside the Refuge
but inside the City limits, from 1943 until the plant was
closed in 1985. (R. 2). In 1984, the City of Northwood Health
Department discovered several Multi-Chem pesticide ingredi-
ents in residential water wells located south of the pesticide
plant. (R. 2). The substances, which meet the test for "haz-
ardous substances" under federal law, were found down gradi-
ent from the plant. (R. 2). The contaminated aquifer is be-
lieved to be hydrologically connected to wetlands and marshes
within the Refuge, which are nontidal and are not navigable.
(R. 2). The City has tested waters within the Refuge and
found pesticide contamination, but further study is required
to determine the extent of the contamination. (R. 2).
The Mayor of the City ordered the contaminated wells
closed. The affected homes were then connected to the munic-
ipal water supply. (R. 2). Although not admitting liability,
Multi-Chem reimbursed the City for the $230,000 spent in
connecting the affected homes to the municipal water supply.
(R. 3). In accepting payment, the City did not waive any
claims against Multi-Chem. (R. 3).
Negotiations between the City, the Department, and
Multi-Chem failed to resolve the question of who should bear
the responsibility for assessing and redressing the injury to
the Refuge from the pesticide contamination. (R. 3). The De-
partment has indicated that it cannot perform the natural re-
source damage assessment the City wants because the Depart-
ment lacks funds. (R. 4). The Department will not have
funding available before 1992, at which time the City claims
the statute of limitations under section 113(g) of CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. § 9613(g), for proceeding against Multi-Chem will have
expired. (R. 4). This litigation ensued.
In the case at bar, the City seeks to compel the Depart-
ment, as a designated "natural resources trustee" under sec-
1990]
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tion 107(f) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f), to perform the
scientific testing necessary to assess the natural resource in-
jury to the Refuge and to recover funds from Multi-Chem
necessary to build an aquifer treatment plant, to cleanse the
groundwater, to monitor, and if necessary, to restock bird
populations if they fall below current levels. (R. 3). Alterna-
tively, the City claims the right to proceed as trustee of the
Refuge and has sued Multi-Chem directly for the cost of the
natural resource damage assessment and remediation. (R. 3).
ISSUE 1
WHETHER THE CITY OF NORTHWOOD CAN COMPEL
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR TO PERFORM
A NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF
THE NORTHWOOD NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE?
A. The Statutory Context.
Congress enacted CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, to
address mounting public concern over the dangers of past im-
proper hazardous waste disposal.1 CERCLA was reauthorized
and substantially amended by the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986, commonly known as
"SARA."'2 CERCLA establishes a framework for remedial ac-
tion and broad-based liability for the costs of remediating
hazardous waste sites. In pertinent part, section 107(a) of
CERCLA provides that:
[A]ny person who at the time of disposal of any hazard-
ous substance owned or operated any facility at which
such hazardous substances were disposed of ... shall be
liable for ... damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss
1. Originally enacted December 11, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (94 Stat. 2767) 6120 (discussing goals of CERCLA). See also
H.R. REP. No. 253 (I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2836 (discussing whether the goals of CERCLA were achieved prior to
the 1986 amendments).
2. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L.
No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1613 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp. 1988)) [hereinafter SARA).
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of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of as-
sessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from
such a release ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The liability provisions of section 107 of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607, have generally been interpreted
by the courts to impose strict, joint and several, and retroac-
tive liability.
In addition, section 107(f)(2)(A) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §
9607(f)(2)(A), provides that the President shall designate fed-
eral officials to act on behalf of the public as trustees of natu-
ral resources under this section, and that the trustees shall
assess damages for injury to natural resources under the fed-
eral trust.
Section 310(a)(2) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(2), is a
citizen suit provision which was added to CERCLA by the
1986 SARA amendments.3 This section authorizes suit
"against the President or any other officer of the United
States ... where there is alleged a failure of the President or
of such other officer to perform any act or duty under this
chapter ... which is not discretionary with the President or
such other officer." 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(2).
B. Summary of the Arguments.
The first cause of action is a citizen suit by the City
against the Department seeking to compel the Department to
conduct an assessment of natural resource damage at the Ref-
uge. The question in this case is whether the Department has
a nondiscretionary duty to conduct an assessment of natural
resource damage at the Refuge. The City will argue that the
Department has such a nondiscretionary duty under the plain
meaning of section 107(f)(2)(A) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §
9607(f)(2)(A), which provides that the Department, as trustee,
"shall" conduct a natural resource damage assessment.
The Department will argue, as the district court below
held, that the authority to make natural resource damage as-
3. Id.
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sessments is part of the arsenal of enforcement powers which
the government in its discretion may elect to exercise. The
Department will also argue that the decision not to exercise
this enforcement authority is discretionary and not the appro-
priate subject of a citizen suit action against the Department.
Arguments may also be raised with respect to the public
trust doctrine. The City will argue that Congress' use of the
term "trustee" in section 107(f) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §
9607(f), invokes duties under the public trust doctrine. The
Department.will argue in response that the public trust doc-
trine has historically been limited to protection of public use
of navigable waterways and has no application in this case.
C. The City of Northwood Will Argue that the Word
"Shall" in Section 107(f) of CERCLA Creates a
Mandatory Duty.
To support the claim that the Department has a nondis-
cretionary duty to act, appellants will point to the plain lan-
guage of section 107(f), which provides:
(1) . . . The President, or the authorized representative
of any State, shall act on behalf of the public as trustee of
such natural resources .... (2)(A) The President shall
designate ... the Federal officials who shall act on behalf
of the public as trustees for natural resources under this
chapter .... Such officials shall assess damages for injury
to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources . . . and
may, upon request of and reimbursement from a State
and at the Federal officials' discretion, assess damages for
those natural resources under the State's trusteeship.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) & (f)(2)(A).
Pursuant to section 115 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9615,
the President delegated to the Department the authority to
4. "[N]atural resources" is defined as "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water,
ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to, man-
aged by, held in trist by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United
States . . . any State or local government .... " CERCLA § 101(16), 42 U.S.C. §
9601(16) (1988).
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act as natural resources trustee for all National Wildlife Ref-
uges. Exec. Order No. 12,580, § 1(c)(2), 52 Fed. Reg. 2923
(1987). See also 40 C.F.R. § 300.72 (1989).
Appellants will argue that the court need not look further
than the statutory language. "If Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue [and] if the intent of Congress
is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress." Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). In Chevron, the Su-
preme Court discussed the standard of review that courts
should apply when reviewing any agency's interpretation of a
statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45. The Court reviewed a
regulation promulgated by the EPA pursuant to the Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988), which defined the term
"stationary source." The Court, in finding that the EPA inter-
pretation was reasonable, set forth a two step analysis: (1) the
court should first determine "whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue," Chevron, 467 U.S. at
842, and (2) if it is determined that Congress has not ad-
dressed the issue, then the court should determine "whether
the agency's answer is based on permissible construction of
the statute." Id. at 843.
Following the plain meaning rationale, the City will assert
that Congress chose the word "shall" in section 107(f) of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f), rather than "may" intending to
require a mandatory duty to act. If Congress had intended to
provide the trustee with a discretionary duty, the word "may"
would have been used. Asserting that "a fundamental canon
of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined,
words will be interpreted taking their ordinary, contemporary,
common meaning," appellants will argue that the Depart-
ment, as appointed by the President, is under a mandatory
duty to conduct a damage assessment of the Refuge.
The City may also argue that mandatory effect should be
given to the use of the word "shall" in section 107(f)(2)(A) of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A), because within that same
section Congress distinguished between mandatory and dis-
cretionary duties. The section imposes upon the President or
1990]
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his designee three separate mandatory duties and a fourth
duty which is clearly discretionary. Section 107(f) of CER-
CLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f), states that the President shall des-
ignate federal officials who shall act as trustees on behalf of
the public and shall assess damages for injury to natural re-
sources within their trusteeship. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (emphasis
added). Within the same sentence, Congress goes on to pro-
vide that with respect to natural resources under the state's
trusteeship, designated federal officials "may, upon request of
and reimbursement from the State and at the Federal offi-
cials' discretion" assess damages for those natural resources.
Id. (emphasis added). The City may argue that Congress
knows how to draw the distinction between mandatory and
discretionary duties and has made those distinctions plainly
in this section of the Act.
The City may also argue that construction of the Act re-
quiring a mandatory duty to conduct a natural resource as-
sessment is consistent with the broad remedial purpose of
CERCLA. If "shall" is given a discretionary effect in this sec-
tion, it may undercut the mandatory effect of other parts of
CERCLA that use the word "shall" to establish duties and
responsibilities. To interpret the word "shall" as imposing
only a discretionary duty throughout CERCLA would frus-
trate the intended purpose of the statute. See Mayor of Boon-
ton v. Drew Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663, 666 (D.N.J. 1985)
(CERCLA is a "far reaching remedial statute"); City of New
York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(CERCLA is a remedial statute designed by Congress to "pro-
tect and preserve the public health and the environment")
(citing Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc.,
805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986)).
D. The Department of Interior Will Argue that Its Au-
thority to Conduct a Natural Resource Assessment
Is Part of Its Enforcement Arsenal and that a Deci-
sion Not to Exercise this Enforcement Option Is
Discretionary and Not Reviewable by the Court.
The Department will argue that its authority to conduct a
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natural resource damage assessment of the Refuge is part of
the arsenal of enforcement options under CERCLA, and that
the decision not to exercise this option is a discretionary en-
forcement decision. Appellees will cite to Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985), for the proposition that "an agency's
decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed
immune from judicial review... [as] such a decision has tra-
ditionally been 'committed to agency discretion' .... "
In Heckler, the Supreme Court considered the extent to
which a decision by an agency "to exercise its 'discretion' not
to undertake certain enforcement actions is subject to judicial
review ..... Heckler, 470 U.S. at 823. In Heckler, the inmates
of a prison sought to force the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to commence an enforcement action pursuant to the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Id. The pris-
oners contended that the FDA violated the FDCA by not ap-
proving specific drugs used in death penalty executions. Id.
The Supreme Court emphasized the difference between af-
firmative agency actions under a clear statutory scheme and
the refusal to act or undertake an enforcement action within
the prosecutorial discretion of that agency. Id. at 832. The
Court held that the Agency's refusal to act is presumptively
nonreviewable by the judiciary. Id. at 832-33.
The Court in Heckler stated that an agency's enforce-
ment decisions are based on its expertise in matters that often
require the specialized knowledge of the agency. Id. at 831.
The Court concluded that, while administrative actions are
generally immune from judicial review, the action is only
"presumptively unreviewable; the presumption may be rebut-
ted where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for
the Agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers."
Id. at 832-33.
Appellees will argue that the Department's decision not
to perform an assessment of the natural resource damages in
the instant case constituted an enforcement decision, and
therefore, a discretionary act. Appellees will assert that an en-
forcement action begins with the investigation; the assessment
that enables the Secretary to determine whether or not the
Department had to act in order to protect the resource for
1990]
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which it serves as a trustee under section 107(f) of CERCLA,
42 U.S.C. § 9607(f). Under Heckler, appellees will contend the
City has the burden of showing that Congress intended to cir-
cumscribe an agency's enforcement discretion by providing
meaningful standards to define the limits of this discretion. If
Congress has not provided such standards, "then an agency
refusal to institute (enforce) proceedings is a decision 'com-
mitted to agency discretion by law .... " Heckler, 470 U.S. at
834-35. Therefore, the Department, as natural resources trus-
tee, has only a discretionary duty to act.
The Department may also rely on citizen suit actions
brought under other environmental laws, in which efforts to
compel enforcement action by the EPA were rejected because
they did not involve a nondiscretionary duty by the agency to
enforce the law against a particular violator. See, e.g., City of
Seabrook v. Costle, 659 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1981).
The Department and Multi-Chem will assert that section
107(f) of CERCLA, U.S.C. § 9607(f) commits the question of
enforcement to the sole discretion of the natural resources
trustee, the Interior Department, thus opposing the City's
contentions that the phrase, "shall act as a trustee," in section
107(f) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f), imposes a mandatory
duty on the Department to conduct testing and assess dam-
ages. Section 107(f) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) provides,
in pertinent part, that "the President or the authorized repre-
sentative of any state, shall act on behalf of the public as trus-
tee of such natural resources to recover for such damages." 42
U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1). The power of enforcement duties, with re-
gard to all National Wildlife Refuges, was delegated by the
President to the Interior Department. Exec. Order No. 12,580,
52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987).
While the Department is described as a "trustee" for pur-
poses of damage recovery, it is in fact the trustee for all natu-
ral resources. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1). Appellees will urge that
since the Department is charged with the responsibility to re-
cover damages for a vast amount of land, the Department
must make practical choices as to when and where to assert
its administrative authority. CERCLA's legislative history
demonstrates that Congress intended that the Interior De-
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partment limit the amount of claims through the use of settle-
ments. H.R. REP. No. 98, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6195.
The National Priorities List (NPL), created under CER-
CLA, ranks the most severe threats to the environment and to
public health. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B). The NPL contains
designations of various sites which are known as the "top pri-
ority among known response targets." Id. Each of the fifty
states is allowed to designate one facility to be placed on this
list. Id. In Eagle-Pitcher Industries v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 919
(D.C. Cir. 1985), the court recognized that agencies charged
with the enforcement of CERCLA may refuse to collect and
assess damages against certain release sites because of limited
funds or other priorities. The court stated that even if a site
was on the NPL, an administrative agency could still refuse to
take action at that release site. Id. at 908.
The Department made its decision not to act at the Ref-
uge only after it conducted preliminary testing of the site and
had extensive conversations with Multi-Chem. (R. 3). In Si-
erra Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1985), the court
permitted the Department, through the Bureau of Land Man-
agement, to interpret duties of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 to pertain to the lands covered by
that Act as a whole, rather than reviewing each on a case-by-
case basis. In the case at bar, appellees will argue that this
court should follow the language and intent of CERCLA and
allow the Department to decide what is best for the country
as a whole rather than on a claim system of first come first
serve.
E. The City of Northwood Will Argue that Section
107(f) of CERCLA Imposes upon the Department of
Interior as Trustee Duties Under the Public Trust
Doctrine.
The City will further argue that Congress' use of the term
"trustee" in section 107(f) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f),
invokes the public trust doctrine and that the nondiscretion-
ary duties of the Department of the Interior include the du-
1990]
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ties of a trustee under the common law. The public trust doc-
trine is deeply rooted in Anglo-American common law.
Huffman, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi: A Hidden
Victory for Private Property? 19 Envtl. L. Inst. 10051 (Feb.
1989).' The City will argue that the Department is subject to
a general, public trust duty. In Sierra Club v. Department of
the Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90, 95 (N.D. Cal. 1974), the court
held that the Department has a legal duty to "utilize the spe-
cific powers. .. whenever reasonably necessary for the protec-
tion of the park and that any discretion vested in the Secre-
tary . . . is subordinate to his paramount legal duty imposed,
not only under his trust obligation but by the statute itself
." Id.
The Department of the Interior is subject to a general
public trust duty under the National Park System Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1-460ee (1988). In Sierra Club v. Department of the
Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975), the court ordered
the Department of the Interior to acquire lands on the periph-
ery of the Redwood National Park in order to protect the
scenery and wildlife within the park.
States have applied the public trust doctrine to protect
their natural resources. State courts have not restricted the
application of the doctrine to navigable waters. In New
Jersey, the public trust doctrine applies to recreational uses of
all publicly held beaches. Borough of Neptune City v. Bor-
ough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972). In
Delaware, the public trust doctrine applies to public parks.
City of Wilmington v. Lord, 378 A.2d 635 (1977).
5. The earliest case in the United States was Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821),
in which the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the claim of a riparian landowner to
exclusive rights over oyster beds in tidal waters. The New Jersey Supreme Court in
Arnold declared "[t]he sovereign power ... cannot ... make a direct and absolute
grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right." Id.
at 78. The United States Supreme Court first recognized the public trust doctrine in
Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842), a case in which a claimant
sought exclusive rights of oyster beds adjacent to his riparian land. The Supreme
Court found the pre-statehood grants of the English Crown were invalid, as the pub-
lic trust doctrine prevented the English Crown from granting such rights. Id. at 418.
[Vol. 7
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F. The Department of the Interior Will Argue that the
Public Trust Doctrine Is Limited to Protection of
the Public Use of Navigable Waterways and Has No
Application to this Case.
The Department, joined by Multi-Chem, will argue that
application of the public trust doctrine is limited to the pro-
tection of navigable waterways for use by the people for navi-
gation, fishing, and commerce, and has no application in this
case. This argument has support in a recent Supreme Court
decision. In 1988, the United States Supreme Court decided
Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, reh'g denied,
486 U.S. 1018 (1988), a case which involved competing private
and public claims to nonnavigable, inland, tidal lands; i.e., wa-
ters affected by the tides but not adjacent to the coast. The
Supreme Court decided that Mississippi held the legal title to
lands underlying nonnavigable tidewaters. 484 U.S. at 481. Ti-
tles remain in the state unless the tide land was granted by
the state or unless subject to a pre-statehood grant, recog-
nized at the time of statehood. The Phillips Petroleum opin-
ion reaffirms the traditional "navigability in fact" test to de-
termine whether non-tidal submerged lands are public trust
lands. 484 U.S. at 479.
The appellees will argue that the Department is subject
only to the trust duties imposed by CERCLA. In support of
this argument is Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 449
(D.D.C. 1980), where the court limited the Department's du-
ties to the statutory duties enumerated in the National Park
Service Organic Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. § la-1 (1988). In fur-
ther support of the appellees' position is Sierra Club v. Block,
622 F. Supp. 842, 866 (D. Colo. 1985), where the court stated:
"Where Congress has set out statutory directives, as in the
instant case, for the management and protection of public
6. In Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional an Illinois statute granting lands along the Chicago lake shore
to the railroad. The grant violated a "trust for the people of the State that they may
enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of
fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties." Id. at
452.
1990]
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lands, those statutory duties 'compris[e] all the responsibili-
ties which defendants must faithfully discharge.'" Id. (quot-
ing Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 449 (D.D.C.
1980)). To hold otherwise, appellees will assert, and interpret
the "public trust doctrine" as imposing a higher duty on the
Department, would create a new duty to investigate and as-
sess damages for every area with a hazardous release, no mat-
ter how minor.
ISSUE 2
WHETHER THE CITY OF NORTHWOOD MAY ACT AS
PUBLIC RESOURCE TRUSTEE UNDER CERCLA SEC-
TION 107(F), 42 U.S.C. § 9607, IN PLACE OF THE INTE-
RIOR DEPARTMENT AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DES-
IGNATION AS TRUSTEE BY THE STATE GOVERNOR?
A. The Statutory Context.
CERCLA section 107(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) provides sev-
eral potential means by which trustees may act to protect nat-
ural resources within a state. Section 107(f)(1) provides that
under section 107(a), "liability shall be to the United States
Government and to any State for natural resources within the
State or belonging to, managed by, controlled by, or apper-
taining to such State .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1). Section
107(f)(1) goes on to provide "[tihe President, or the author-
ized representative of any State, shall act on behalf of the
public as trustee of such natural resources to recover for such
damages." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1). Section 107(f)(2)(A) pro-
vides that "[t]he President shall designate in the National
Contingency Plan .. .the Federal officials who shall act on
behalf of the public as trustees for natural resources . . . ." 42
U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A). In section 107(f)(2)(B), the statute
provides that "[tihe Governor of each State shall designate
State officials who may act on behalf of the public as trustees
for natural resources . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(B).
B. Summary of the Arguments.
In the second cause of action, the City asserts the right to
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proceed as the trustee on its own behalf, and has sued Multi-
Chem to compel a natural resource assessment and appropri-
ate remedial action. The City will argue that section 107(f) of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) should be interpreted broadly
to allow the City to act as the natural resource trustee for the
Refuge. Multi-Chem will argue that the City may act as natu-
ral resource trustee only if it is designated as such by the gov-
ernor of the state and that no such designation has been
made.
C. Interpretation of "State."
In Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chemical Corp., 621 F.
Supp. 663 (D.N.J. 1985), the district court, in interpreting sec-
tion 107(a), held "CERCLA is to be given a broad and liberal
construction." Id. at 666. The City will contend that it may
bring an action under section 107(f) since "State," as defined
by section 101(27), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(27), can be construed to
include a municipality, such as the City of Northwood. The
district court in Mayor of Boonton declared "[i]t has been
said 'the word included is usually a term of enlargement and
not of limitation . . . . It, therefore, conveys the conclusion
that there are other items includable, though not specifically
enumerated . . . .'" Mayor of Boonton, 621 F. Supp. at 666.
In contrast, when the term "means" rather than "includes" is
used, the definition is construed as being exclusive. Id. Fol-
lowing the rationale outlined by the district court in Mayor of
Boonton, the City will assert section 101(27) explicitly con-
templates an expansion of the illustrative list in section
101(27). The term "State" -in section 101(27), 42 U.S.C. §
9601(27), does not expressly list municipalities, nor does it ex-
pressly exclude them.
In Mayor of Boonton, the court held that CERCLA sec-
tion 101(27) "explicitly contemplates an expansion of the il-
lustrative list by the courts to the fullest extent where to do so
would be consistent with the remedial intent of the Act."
Mayor of Boonton, 621 F. Supp. at 666. The district court
went on to state:
It would be anomalous for this far reaching remedial stat-
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ute [CERCLA] to give states a cause of action for dam-
ages to natural resources owned by the State but for it to
exclude cities from access to such a cause of action while
expressly including resources owned by "local govern-
ments" within the scope of the protected subject of §
9607(a)(4)(C).
Id.
The district court in Mayor of Boonton based its liberal
construction of the statutory definition of "State" on a previ-
ous Supreme Court decision which found that a federal statu-
tory definition utilizing the phrase, "shall be deemed to in-
clude," was "inclusive rather than exclusive." Pfizer, Inc. v.
India, 434 U.S. 308, 312 (1978). This rationale was followed in
City of New York v. Exxon, 697 F. Supp. 677, 684 (S.D.N.Y.
1988), where the court interpreted the definition of "State" in
CERCLA section 101 to include a municipality. Id. at 684.
Based on the Mayor of Boonton and City of New York
decisions, the City, supported on this issue by the Depart-
ment, will urge the Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit
to find that the definition of "State" is not an exclusive term,
and that a municipality such as the City is within the defini-
tion of the term "State" within section 107(f)(1). On this ba-
sis, the City will urge that it may act as the natural resource
trustee of the Refuge and bring an action on behalf of the
public under section 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).
Additionally, the City will argue that Congress tacitly af-
firmed the Mayor of Boonton and City of New York decisions
at the time of the 1986 SARA amendments to CERCLA. The
conference committee intentionally left the definition of
"State" unchanged when enacting SARA stating it was "leav-
ing it to the court's interpretation of [the provision]."
Maraziti, Local Governments: Opportunities to Recover for
Natural Resource Damages, 17 Envtl. L. Inst. at 10036(7)
(Feb. 1987), citing H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 185
(1986). Further support of the congressional affirmation of the
decisions in Mayor. of Boonton and City of New York are the
comments made by Senator Lautenberg, a member of the
Conference Committee. Senator Lautenberg stated the
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amendment would "uphold the Boonton decision allowing
municipalities to sue for cost recovery under the same
Superfund provisions available to states, and to serve as
trustees for natural resources." Id. (emphasis added), citing
135 CONG. REC. S14912 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986).
Multi-Chem will contend that cities are not included in
the section 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601, definition of "State" and
the court should not hold to the contrary, against the plain
language of the statute. Section 101(27) states: "The terms
'United States' and 'State' include the several States of the
United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the United States
Virgin Islands, [and] the Commonwealth of Northern Mari-
anas . . . ." This statute makes no reference to political sub-
divisions such as cities; therefore, appellees will urge that cit-
ies are not to be included in the definition. Additionally, there
is no reference to political subdivisions in the Code of Federal
Regulations authorizing cities to act as trustees for natural re-
sources. 40 C.F.R. § 300.73 (1989).
D. "Authorized Representative."
The City and the Department will contend that the City
can be designated as an "authorized representative" of the
state and therefore can act as a trustee for the Refuge. Under
section 107(f)(1), "[t]he President, or the authorized represen-
tative of any State, shall act on behalf of the public as trustee
of such natural resources . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).
"[A]uthorized representative" is not defined within CERCLA,
but the term has been defined by the courts. In Mayor of
Boonton, the court held that "authorized representative" in-
cluded the City of Boonton, and that the municipality could,
therefore, serve as a natural resource trustee. Mayor of Boon-
ton, 621 F. Supp. at 668. The district court stated:
[T]hat either by liberally construing the language of
CERCLA in light of its broad remedial purposes or by
specifically construing § 9607(f) [§ 107(f)] in light of state
law giving municipalities broad powers, a municipality is
a state or authorized representative thereof for purposes
1990]
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of invoking the provisions of CERCLA.
Id.
While this decision predates the SARA amendments,
which added section 107(f)(2), and provides for the express
designation of federal and state trustees, the City and the De-
partment will argue the case should be given great weight
based on its logical conclusion.
The Department, appointed by the President as natural
resource trustee for all national wildlife resources, supports
the City's efforts to act as natural resource trustee. The City
will argue the Department's interpretation of the statute
should receive deferential treatment by the court. The Su-
preme Court in Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1983), sup-
ports the City's position. In Chevron, the Supreme Court
stated "when the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
Agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute." Id. at 843. The Supreme Court held that "considera-
ble weight should be accorded to an executive department's
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to adminis-
ter." Id. at 844. The Department and the City will contend
the City may act as a natural resource trustee in accordance
with the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron.
Appellees will contend that the City is not authorized to
act as a trustee for natural resources under the provisions of
CERCLA. Section 107(f)(2)(A) provides that "[tihe President
shall designate . . . Federal officials who shall act . . . as
trustees for natural resources . . . ." 42 U.S.C. §
9607(f)(2)(A). Section 107(f)(2)(B) provides "[t]he Governor
of each state shall designate State officials who may act ...
as trustees for natural resources .... " 42 U.S.C. §
9607(f)(2)(B) (1988). The record indicates the Governor did
not appoint an official of the City as official trustee. (R. 5-6).
Relying on the plain language of section 107(f)(2) and the
Governor's failure to appoint the City's mayor to a trustee's
position, Multi-Chem will urge that the court should not in-
terfere with the Governor's reasonable discretion.
Additionally, Multi-Chem will assert that section 107(f)
[Vol. 7
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss2/9
JUDGES' MEMORANDUM
of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f), added in the 1986 SARA
amendments to CERCLA, defined an "authorized representa-
tive" as one who has been appointed to the position by the
President or by a state governor. Appellees will assert that
this section served to reverse prior court decisions which had
allowed cities to serve as state trustees for state natural re-
source damage claims, such as in Mayor of Boonton v. Drew
Chemical Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663 (D.N.J. 1985) and City of
New York v. Exxon, 697 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Appel-
lees will argue the 1986 amendment was intended to clarify
who could serve as a trustee for state natural resource damage
claims by vesting the sole appointment power to the President
or state governors. Therefore, based on CERCLA section
107(f)(2)(A) and (B), Multi-Chem will contend that the City
cannot institute a natural resource damage action since it did
not receive the statutorily required appointment from the
Governor.
To support its position, Multi-Chem may cite City of
Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Corp., 713 F. Supp. 1484
(E.D. Pa. 1989). In that case, the district court did not con-
sider the definition of "State" ambiguous nor did it find any
support in the legislative history to include municipalities
within the definition. Id. at 1489. The district court stated
that the starting point in attempting to discern the intent of
Congress in enacting a particular statutory section is the plain
meaning of the words. Id. at 1488. The court noted the defini-
tion of "State" in CERCLA section 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601,
does not include the word "municipality." Id. Additionally,
the court stated that "[t]he fact . . . that Congress, in other
statutes, has defined 'state' broadly to include municipalities
is of no moment" to interpreting "State" in terms of CER-
CLA. Id. at 1489. The district court found that since Congress
had referred specifically to "municipalities," "local govern-
ments," and "political subdivisions" in certain sections of
CERCLA, it was reasonable to conclude that "the omission of
municipalities from the definition of 'State' was not accidental
and that Congress had no intention of implicitly including
municipalities within the word 'State.'" Id. at 1489, citing 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601(21), 9605(4).
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The district court in City of Philadelphia declined to ac-
cept Mayor of Boonton as dispositive. Id. at 1489. The court
found the language of section 107 conclusive and declined to
substitute its judgment for that of Congress. Id. Relying on
City of Philadelphia, appellees will assert that since Congress
did not include the term "cities" as one of the parties who
may bring an action for natural resource damages, where it
had an ample opportunity to do so in the 1986 amendment, it
should not reach a conclusion contrary to the intent of Con-
gress. The court in City of Philadelphia examined the legisla-
tive history of SARA and concluded the amendment reflects
Congress' decision not to include local municipalities within
the definition of a "State." Id. at 1489, n. 15, citing H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 185, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3278. However, appellants may
point to the fact that Congress did provide a clause which al-
lows the governor of the state to appoint a local government
as a trustee. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2).
Multi-Chem can argue the case at bar is factually distin-
guishable from Mayor of Boonton and City of New York. Un-
like those two cases, the present case involves a trustee al-
ready appointed for the Refuge. In addition, the present case
is distinguishable from these two previous decisions in that
the City does not own the Refuge. The Refuge is a federal
National Wildlife Refuge, (R. 2), and Multi-Chem will urge, it
is the sole responsibility of the Department to act as the trus-
tee for this Refuge.
Finally, the City might try to bring a claim for natural
resource damages as a "person" under the citizen suit provi-
sions of section 310(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a). CERCLA does
not authorize private persons to assert natural resource dam-
age claims, unless that "person" is a governmental entity. Ar-
tesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 649 (3d
Cir. 1988). Appellees will assert that since the City has not
7. Section 310(a) provides that a citizen suit enforcement action may be brought
by "any person" "(1) against any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of any
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order which has become effective
pursuant to this chapter ... ." 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a).
[Vol. 7
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss2/9
1990] JUDGES' MEMORANDUM 431
received such a designation, it is not authorized to bring such
an action.
21
